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Sync Collecting Fix Commits: Tue May 19 20:17:44 UTC 2026
Signed-off-by: AboutCode Automation <automation@aboutcode.org>
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data/fix-commits/advisory-database-b78f1d41.json

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data/fix-commits/capstone-d6e3f795.json

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{
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"vcs_url": "https://github.com/capstone-engine/capstone",
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"vulnerabilities": {
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"CVE-2026-47143": {
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"fab595205fee206f5c21be6ed8ad2eaf9225f1c7": "Backport of CVE-2026-47143 fix (#2924)\n\nReported by https://github.com/honey-nut-cheerios"
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},
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"GHSA-97V9-6W8P-MH32": {
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"18ea7ad7e72e9a5061727d23f2f0a3894c07e969": "Remove unused fuzzit.sh script and key. (#2797)\n\nIn https://github.com/capstone-engine/capstone/security/advisories/GHSA-97v9-6w8p-mh32,\nAnton-4 pointed out that the FUZZIT_API_KEY was public in the script.\n\nThis is no longer a problem because Fuzzit was acquired by GitLab in 2020,\nand they stated that all data was removed six months later.\n\nThe advisory was closed by us because it doesn't seem to be a security issue.\nHowever, we don't know at this time if the key was public or private.\nIf the key was public, it was allowed to be in the repo.\nIf the key turns out to be private, it very likely has no impact anymore.\n\nNonetheless, if it later turns out to be private, we can reopen the advisory.\nThe fix, simply removing the unused script, would still be the same.\n\nGitHub doesn't seem to allow publishing closed advisories,\nso the link above unfortunately only works for maintainers.\n\nThanks a lot, Anton-4, for reporting the issue!\n\nReferences:\n\n- https://github.com/capstone-engine/capstone/security/advisories/GHSA-97v9-6w8p-mh32\n- https://web.archive.org/web/20201026032736/https://fuzzit.dev/2020/06/11/news-fuzzit-is-acquired-by-gitlab/"
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data/fix-commits/langchain-c5a32632.json

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data/fix-commits/linux.git-074cb445.json

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{
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"vcs_url": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux.git",
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"vulnerabilities": {
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"CVE-2023-20585": {
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"1f44aab79bac31f459422dfb213e907bb386509c": "iommu/amd: Use maximum PPR log buffer size when SNP is enabled on Family 0x19\n\nDue to CVE-2023-20585, the PPR log buffer must use the maximum supported\nsize (512K) on Genoa (Family 0x19, model >= 0x10) systems when SNP is\nenabled, to mitigate a potential security vulnerability. Note that Family\n0x19 models below 0x10 (Milan) do not support PPR when SNP is enabled.\nHence the PPR log size increase is only applied for model >= 0x10.\nAll other systems continue to use the default PPR log buffer size (8K).\n\nApply the errata fix by making the following changes:\n\n- Introduce global new variable (amd_iommu_pprlog_size) to have PPR log buffer\n size. Adjust variable size for Genoa family.\n\n- Extend 'amd_iommu_apply_erratum_snp()' to also set the PPR log buffer\n size to maximum for Family 0x19 model >= 0x10 when SNP is enabled.\n\n- Rename PPR_* macros to make it more readable.\n\nLink: https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-3016.html\nCc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>\nCc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>\nCc: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>\nSigned-off-by: Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde@amd.com>\nTested-by: Dheeraj Kumar Srivastava <dheerajkumar.srivastava@amd.com>\nSigned-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>",
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"58c0ac6125d89bf6ec65a521eaeb52a0e8e20a9f": "iommu/amd: Use maximum Event log buffer size when SNP is enabled on Family 0x19\n\nDue to CVE-2023-20585, the Event log buffer must use the maximum supported\nsize (512K) on Milan/Genoa (Family 0x19) systems when SNP is enabled,\nto mitigate a potential security vulnerability. All other systems continue to\nuse the default Event log buffer size (8K).\n\nApply the errata fix by making the following changes:\n\n* Introduce new global variable (amd_iommu_evtlog_size) to have event log\n buffer size. Adjust variable size for family 0x19.\n\n* Since 'iommu_snp_enable()' must be called after the core IOMMU subsystem\n is initialized, it cannot be moved to the early init stage. The SNP errata\n must also be applied after the 'iommu_snp_enable()' check. Therefore,\n 'alloc_event_buffer()' and 'iommu_enable_event_buffer()' are now called\n in the IOMMU_ENABLED state, after the errata is applied.\n\n* Adjust alloc_event_buffer() and iommu_enable_event_buffer() to handle\n all IOMMU instances.\n\n* Also rename EVT_* macros to make it more readable.\n\nLink: https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-3016.html\nCc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>\nCc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>\nCc: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>\nSigned-off-by: Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde@amd.com>\nTested-by: Dheeraj Kumar Srivastava <dheerajkumar.srivastava@amd.com>\nSigned-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>"
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},
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"CVE-2026-31787": {
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"24daca4fc07f3ff8cd0e3f629cd982187f48436a": "xen/privcmd: fix double free via VMA splitting\n\nprivcmd_vm_ops defines .close (privcmd_close), but neither .may_split\nnor .open. When userspace does a partial munmap() on a privcmd mapping,\nthe kernel splits the VMA via __split_vma(). Since may_split is NULL,\nthe split is allowed. vm_area_dup() copies vm_private_data (a pages\narray allocated in alloc_empty_pages()) into the new VMA without any\nfixup, because there is no .open callback.\n\nBoth VMAs now point to the same pages array. When the unmapped portion\nis closed, privcmd_close() calls:\n - xen_unmap_domain_gfn_range()\n - xen_free_unpopulated_pages()\n - kvfree(pages)\n\nThe surviving VMA still holds the dangling pointer. When it is later\ndestroyed, the same sequence runs again, which leads to a double free.\n\nFix this issue by adding a .may_split callback denying the VMA split.\n\nThis is XSA-487 / CVE-2026-31787\n\nFixes: d71f513985c2 (\"xen: privcmd: support autotranslated physmap guests.\")\nReported-by: Atharva Vartak <atharva.a.vartak@gmail.com>\nSuggested-by: Atharva Vartak <atharva.a.vartak@gmail.com>\nSigned-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>\nReviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>"
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"CVE-2026-31786": {
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"27fdbab4221b375de54bf91919798d88520c6e28": "Buffer overflow in drivers/xen/sys-hypervisor.c\n\nThe build id returned by HYPERVISOR_xen_version(XENVER_build_id) is\nneither NUL terminated nor a string.\n\nThe first causes a buffer overflow as sprintf in buildid_show will\nread and copy till it finds a NUL.\n\n00000000 f4 91 51 f4 dd 38 9e 9d 65 47 52 eb 10 71 db 50 |..Q..8..eGR..q.P|\n00000010 b9 a8 01 42 6f 2e 32 |...Bo.2|\n00000017\n\nSo use a memcpy instead of sprintf to have the correct value:\n\n00000000 f4 91 51 f4 dd 00 9e 9d 65 47 52 eb 10 71 db 50 |..Q.....eGR..q.P|\n00000010 b9 a8 01 42 |...B|\n00000014\n\n(the above have a hack to embed a zero inside and check it's\nreturned correctly).\n\nThis is XSA-485 / CVE-2026-31786\n\nFixes: 84b7625728ea (\"xen: add sysfs node for hypervisor build id\")\nSigned-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <frediano.ziglio@citrix.com>\nReviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>\nSigned-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>"
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},
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"CVE-2025-37780": {
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"24376458138387fb251e782e624c7776e9826796": "isofs: validate block number from NFS file handle in isofs_export_iget\n\nisofs_fh_to_dentry() and isofs_fh_to_parent() pass an attacker-\ncontrolled block number (ifid->block or ifid->parent_block) from\nthe NFS file handle to isofs_export_iget(), which only rejects\nblock == 0 before calling isofs_iget() and ultimately sb_bread().\nA crafted file handle with fh_len sufficient to pass the check\nadded by commit 0405d4b63d08 (\"isofs: Prevent the use of too small\nfid\") can still drive the server to read any in-range block on the\nbacking device as if it were an iso_directory_record. That earlier\nfix was assigned CVE-2025-37780.\n\nsb_bread() on an out-of-range block returns NULL cleanly via the\nEIO path, so there is no memory-safety violation. For in-range\nreads of adjacent-partition data on the same block device, the\nunrelated bytes end up in iso_inode_info fields that reach the NFS\nclient as dentry metadata. The deployment surface (isofs exported\nover NFS from loop-mounted images) is narrow and requires an\nauthenticated NFS peer, but the malformed-file-handle class is\nreportable as hardening next to the existing CVE-2025-37780 fix.\n\nReject block >= ISOFS_SB(sb)->s_nzones in isofs_export_iget() so\nthe check covers both isofs_fh_to_dentry() and isofs_fh_to_parent()\ncall sites with a single line.\n\nFixes: 0405d4b63d08 (\"isofs: Prevent the use of too small fid\")\nCc: stable@vger.kernel.org\nAssisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7\nSigned-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>\nLink: https://patch.msgid.link/20260419212155.2169382-3-michael.bommarito@gmail.com\nSigned-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>"
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},
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"CVE-2026-0995": {
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"858fbd7248bd84b2899fb2c29bc7bc2634296edf": "Merge branch 'for-next/c1-pro-erratum-4193714' into for-next/core\n\n* for-next/c1-pro-erratum-4193714:\n : Work around C1-Pro erratum 4193714 (CVE-2026-0995)\n arm64: errata: Work around early CME DVMSync acknowledgement\n arm64: cputype: Add C1-Pro definitions\n arm64: tlb: Pass the corresponding mm to __tlbi_sync_s1ish()\n arm64: tlb: Introduce __tlbi_sync_s1ish_{kernel,batch}() for TLB maintenance"
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data/fix-commits/moby-fc18b20f.json

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{
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"vcs_url": "https://github.com/moby/moby",
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"vulnerabilities": {
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"GHSA-VP62-88P7-QQF5": {
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"7a7dc016bf51235a96e4f7d10aa2bda5733c2071": "Merge pull request #52648 from vvoland/25-GHSA-vp62-88p7-qqf5\n\n[25.0 backport] daemon/copy: Fix symlink escape in mount destination creation",
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"af1613468c1023941f3d701344ee1df376ba9f8a": "Merge pull request from GHSA-vp62-88p7-qqf5"
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},
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"GHSA-X86F-5XW2-FM2R": {
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"06224f7ad000fda8de7939ea08aa61ad9814ee63": "Merge pull request from GHSA-x86f-5xw2-fm2r"
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},
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"GHSA-RG2X-37C3-W2RH": {
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"bb6a9b177dc457b024300dfa87b4e51a86bf6406": "Merge pull request from GHSA-rg2x-37c3-w2rh"
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"GHSA-VP62-88P7-QQF5": {
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"af1613468c1023941f3d701344ee1df376ba9f8a": "Merge pull request from GHSA-vp62-88p7-qqf5"
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"CVE-2026-42501": {
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"0fdc152a31033aa66c5b79584a2a448d9c388c41": "update to go1.26.3\n\nThis release include 11 security fixes:\n\n- cmd/go: malicious module proxy can bypass checksum database\n\n A malicious module proxy could exploit a flaw in the go command's\n validation of module checksums to bypass checksum database validation.\n\n This vulnerability affects any user using an untrusted module proxy\n (GOMODPROXY) or checksum database (GOSUMDB).\n\n A malicious module proxy can serve altered versions of the Go toolchain.\n When selecting a different version of the Go toolchain than the\n currently installed toolchain (due to the GOTOOLCHAIN environment variable,\n or a go.work or go.mod with a toolchain line), the go command will download\n and execute a toolchain provided by the module proxy. A malicious module\n proxy can bypass checksum database validation for this downloaded\n toolchain.\n\n Since this vulnerability affects the security of toolchain downloads,\n setting GOTOOLCHAIN to a fixed version is not sufficient. You must upgrade\n your base Go toolchain.\n\n The go tool always validates the hash of a toolchain before executing it,\n so fixed versions will refuse to execute any cached, altered versions of the\n toolchain.\n\n The go tool trusts go.sum files to contain accurate hashes of the current\n module's dependencies. A malicious proxy exploiting this vulnerability to\n serve an altered module will have caused an incorrect hash to be recorded\n in the go.sum. Users who have configured a non-trusted GOPROXY can determine\n if they have been affected by running \"rm go.sum ; go mod tidy ; go mod verify\",\n which will revalidate all dependencies of the current module.\n\n The specific flaw in more detail:\n\n The go command consults the checksum database to validate downloaded modules,\n when a module is not listed in the go.sum file. It verifies that the module hash\n reported by the checksum database matches the hash of the downloaded module.\n If, however, the checksum database returns a successful response that contains\n no entry for the module, the go command incorrectly permitted validation to succeed.\n\n A module proxy may mirror or proxy the checksum database, in which case the go\n command will not connect to the checksum database directly. Checksums reported\n by the checksum database are cryptographically signed, so a malicious proxy\n cannot alter the reported checksum for a module. However, a proxy which returns\n an empty checksum response, or a checksum response for an unrelated module,\n could cause the go command to proceed as if a downloaded module has been validated.\n\n The go command now properly checks checksum database responses to ensure\n that the expected module signature is present, not just that if a signature is\n present it matches the expectation.\n\n Thanks to Mundur (https://github.com/M0nd0R) for reporting this issue.\n\n This is CVE-2026-42501 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/79070.\n\n- net/http/httputil: ReverseProxy forwards queries with more than urlmaxqueryparams parameters\n\n When used with a Rewrite function, or a Director function which parses query parameters,\n ReverseProxy sanitizes the forwarded request to remove query parameters which are not\n parsed by url.ParseQuery. ReverseProxy did not take ParseQuery's limit on the total number\n of query parameters (controlled by GODEBUG=urlmaxqueryparams=N) into account.\n This could permit ReverseProxy to forward a request containing a query parameter\n that was not visible to the Rewrite function.\n\n For example, the query \"a1=x&a2=x&...&a10000=x&hidden=y\" could forward the parameter\n \"hidden=y\" while hiding it from the proxy's Rewrite function.\n\n ReverseProxy now avoids forwarding parameters that exceed the ParseQuery limit.\n\n This is CVE-2026-39825 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/78948.\n\n- net: panic in Dial and LookupPort when handling NUL byte on Windows\n\n The Dial and LookupPort functions would panic on Windows when provided\n with an input containing a NUL (0). These functions now return an error\n rather than panicking.\n\n This is CVE-2026-39836 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/79006.\n\n- net/mail: quadratic string concatenation in consumePhrase\n\n Pathological inputs could cause DoS through consumePhrase\n when parsing an email address according to RFC 5322.\n\n This is CVE-2026-42499 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/78987.\n\n- net/mail: quadratic string concatentation in consumeComment\n\n Well-crafted inputs reaching ParseAddress, ParseAddressList,\n and ParseDate were able to trigger excessive CPU exhaustion\n and memory allocations.\n\n This is CVE-2026-39820 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/78566.\n\n- cmd/go: \"go bug\" follows symlinks in predictable temporary filenames\n\n The \"go bug\" command wrote to two files with predictable names in\n the system temporary directory (for example, \"/tmp\").\n\n An attacker with access to the temporary directory could create a\n symlink in one of these names, causing \"go bug\" to overwrite the\n target of the symlink.\n\n The \"go bug\" command now uses os.MkdirTemp to create a safe\n working directory.\n\n Thanks to Harshit Gupta (Mr HAX) for reporting this issue.\n\n This is CVE-2026-39819 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/78584.\n\n- cmd/go: \"go tool pack\" does not sanitize output paths\n\n The \"go tool pack\" subcommand is a minimal version of the Unix ar utility.\n It is used by the compiler as an internal tool with known-good inputs.\n\n The \"pack\" subcommand did not sanitize output filenames.\n When invoked to extract a malicious archive file, it could write\n files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem.\n\n The \"pack\" subcommand now refuses to extract files with names\n containing any directory components.\n\n Thanks to Harshit Gupta (Mr HAX) for reporting this issue.\n\n This is CVE-2026-39817 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/78778.\n\n- net/http: infinite loop in HTTP/2 transport when given bad SETTINGS_MAX_FRAME_SIZE\n\n When processing HTTP/2 SETTINGS frames, transport will enter an infinite loop of\n writing CONTINUATION frames if it receives a SETTINGS_MAX_FRAME_SIZE with a\n value of 0.\n\n This allows potential DoS against a client by a malicious server. HTTP/2\n transport now properly checks that the received SETTINGS_MAX_FRAME_SIZE is\n valid.\n\n Thanks to Marwan Atia (marwansamir688@gmail.com) for reporting this issue.\n\n This is CVE-2026-33814 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/78476.\n\n- html/template: escaper bypass leads to XSS\n\n If a trusted template author were to write a\n tag containing an empty type attribute or a type\n attribute with an ASCII whitespace, the execution of\n the template would incorrectly escape any data passed\n into the block.\n\n Thanks to Mundur (https://github.com/M0nd0R) for reporting this issue.\n\n This is CVE-2026-39826 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/78981.\n\n- net: crash when handling long CNAME response\n\n When using LookupCNAME with the cgo DNS resolver,\n a very long CNAME response could trigger a double-free of C memory\n and a crash. The double-free has been fixed.\n\n Thanks to hamayanhamayan for reporting this issue.\n\n This is CVE-2026-33811 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/78803.\n\n- html/template: bypass of meta content URL escaping causes XSS\n\n CVE-2026-27142 fixed a vulnerability in which URLs were not\n correctly escaped inside of a tag's attribute.\n If the URL content were to insert ASCII whitespaces around the\n = rune inside of the attribute, the escaper would\n fail to similarly escape it, leading to XSS.\n\n Dynamic inputs to a tag's attribute are now\n whitespace sanitized prior to escaping.\n\n Thanks to Samy Ghannad for reporting this issue.\n\nSigned-off-by: Pawe\u0142 Gronowski <pawel.gronowski@docker.com>"
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data/fix-commits/pdfium-893d6260.json

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"vcs_url": "https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/pdfium",
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"CVE-2026-6192": {
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"65c78d0727c665106efed287a687b37d41a49439": "Patch CVE-2026-6192 in libopenjpeg\n\nApply https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/pull/1619\n\nBug: 514547039\nChange-Id: Icae4d89c2a578623c81fe616beab6385def1d8e2\nReviewed-on: https://pdfium-review.googlesource.com/c/pdfium/+/147950\nCommit-Queue: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>\nReviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>"
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"CVE-2025-54874": {
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"83e6b42d10bd8482de0ba6def14ad46c4d8850f9": "Cherry-pick OpenJPEG patch for CVE-2025-54874\n\nCherry-pick a commit from upstream OpenJPEG:\n\nhttps://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/f809b80c67717c152a5ad30bf06774f00da4fd2d\n\nBug: 445128546\nChange-Id: Ie402da715c8342cd948c41c5d44b3edbec29e33c\nReviewed-on: https://pdfium-review.googlesource.com/c/pdfium/+/135731\nCommit-Queue: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>\nReviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>"
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